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Liability of Members of the Board of Directors and
the Managing Director-A Scandinavian Perspective
PROFESSOR ROLF DOTEVALL*

I. Introduction
In Scandinavian countries, questions concerning the liability of the company management have attracted great interest in recent years. Due to several highly publicized financial
scandals that took place in the early 1990s in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, these countries extensively revised their Companies Acts during that period. In general, the amendments made to the Companies Acts involved modifications to management's obligations.
Also, on several occasions over the past ten to fifteen years, Scandinavian courts have issued
rulings concerning board member and managing director liability.
The Companies Acts in the Scandinavian countries are similar, but not identical. They
differ in how they treat private versus public business forms. The private form aims at
regulating relationships in companies conducting business with few partners, in which
the shares are not publicly traded. Conversely, a public company is a company whose
shares may be traded on the stock exchange. For example, in Sweden, both private and
public companies are regulated in the Companies Act (Aktiebolagslagen). In contrast,
Denmark and Norway have various legislation schemes for each different company form.
Under this construct, the Public Companies Act consists of mandatory rules whereas the
private companies do not. However, under Swedish company law, the private form is
subject to mandatory rules.'
The objective of this article is to consider certain questions regarding the board of directors' and the managing director's liability to the company under Scandinavian law.

*Professor Rolf Dotevall is Professor in Commercial Law, Department of Law, School of Economics and
Commercial Law, G6teborg University. Professor Dotevall has written several books and articles on company
and contract law.
1. In Denmark the public company is called "aktieselskab"; the private company "anpartsselskab." The
public company in Norway is called "allemannaksjeselskaper" and the private form "akjeselskaper."
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II. Functions of Corporate Bodies under the Swedish
Companies Act
A.

INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE BODIES

In Sweden, the rules governing company organization and its management in Chapter
8 of the Swedish Companies Act show only a few occasional differences regarding the two
2
company types. This is also the condition in Denmark and Norway.
Under the Swedish Companies Act, an important point of departure from other countries
when determining the company management's liability to the company is that each company shall be hierarchically organized. Shareholders constitute the superior body of the
company, to which both the board of directors and the managing director are subordinate.
Directives submitted by the highest organ of the company shall be followed, unless they
are contrary to the law or to the articles of association under the provisions of Chapter 8
section 34 of the Swedish Companies Act. This organizational structure exempts the managing director from liability if the measures undertaken by him have received the support
of the board of directors or the shareholders.
There are two main ways of approaching the regulations concerning the formal organization of a company. The first, which can be called 'dualistic', means that one of the
company's management bodies has a monitoring function only, while another body leads
the company's operations and represents the company externally; the second, which may
can be called 'monistic', stipulates that each company contains only one management body.
The purest form of the dualistic system is constituted by the organizational rules of the
German Aktiengesetz. Company organization under American and English law constitutes
an example of the monistic system.
The Swedish Companies Act in particular, but also the acts in Denmark and Norway,

perceive management of the company's affairs as a uniform set of duties, in which the
managing director shall be liable under the provisions of Chapter 8 section 25 of the Swedish Companies Act for the day-to-day management of the company. A characteristic feature
of Scandinavian law is that the board of directors does not have a purely monitoring function, in contrast to applicable German law with regard to public companies. For this reason
the Scandinavian model is closer to the monistic system. Under the provisions of Chapter
8 section 14 of the Swedish Companies Act, the monitoring fimction of the board of directors is emphasized because the chairman of the board of directors of a public company
may not be the managing director of that company at the same time. It is furthermore
emphasized in Chapter 8 section 4 of the Companies Act that the board has a special
obligation to monitor the company's operations, and, as a consequence of the hierarchical
structure, to ensure that the managing director discharges his obligations. The board must
also monitor the company's financial position in general, and the group's financial position,
where applicable.

B.

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS' MANDATE

The board of directors is a collegial body. This means that a member of the board is not
entitled to act on his own behalf and independently from the board of directors. The only

2. The Swedish Companies Act 1975: with excerpts from the Accounting Act 1976 (3d ed., Federation of
Swedish Industries 1992) (1976) [hereinafter Swedish Companies Act].
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way for a member of the board to obtain information about the company is by raising the
question about it in the board meeting.
A member of the board has personal liability exposure. A member shall be exempted
from liability if he has made reservations against a decision by having his opinion recorded
in the report of the company proceeding. However, a member of the board who has made
reservations in the above described manner may still become liable if he subsequently participates in the enforcement of the decision. In the majority of case law, enforcement of a
decision has been regarded in the majority of cases as a subsequent acceptance of the decision by the member of the board. Consequentially, when a member of the board is appointed as the company signatory, for example, he may not enter into the agreement without
risking liability to the company.
Additionally, a board member may have personal liability exposure due to treatment of
the position as a personal commission. For example, the personal character of the commission means that a member of the board cannot be granted authorization to form a
quorum.' When a permanent member of the board cannot be present, a deputy-member
shall be appointed. Thus, if the member participated in making decisions of a more principal
character at some earlier stage, he will hardly avoid liability if the board makes more concrete decisions in his absence in accordance with the guiding principles decided upon earlier. 4 Furthermore, repeated absences from the meetings of the board of directors may also
imply that the member of the board has neglected his monitoring duty, subjecting the
member to additional liability.
A deputy-member also has liability exposure for decisions he made while participating
in the meeting of the board of directors as a board member.' However, a deputy-member
who participates in a board meeting on a separate occasion will not be treated as strictly as
the ordinary member who has been following the business activities regularly. Further, the
deputy-member's liability depends on the nature of his involvement. If his involvement in
the decision includes participation in the meetings and access to all bhe material possessed
by the remaining members of the board, the deputy-member's liability can hardly be treated
differently than the permanent members of the board.
C. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES OF A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AND OF AN EMPLOYEE

In some companies, the company's management may be organized somewhat differently
than as provided for in the Swedish Companies Act. A company may institute committees,
for example, that will examine and prepare certain questions to be discussed afterwards by
the boards of directors. Members of such committees are not liable, unless they are also
members of the board.
The provisions of the Swedish Companies Act concerning liability for damages probably
should not be applied analogously to other leading officers of the company. 6 The reason is

3. See Danish UfR 1981.262;
Forlag 1999).

THOR8JORN SOFSRUD, BESTYRELSENS BESLLUTNING OG ANSVAR

70 (Akademisk

4. See ROLF DOTEVALL, BOLACSLEDNINGENS SKADESTANDSANSVAR
62 (NorstedtsJuridik 1999).
5. See CARL SVERNL6V, AKTIEBOLAGETS SUPLEANTER: SUPPLEANTINSTITUTET I SVENSK AKTIEBOLAGSRATr

62

(Norstedts Juridik 1998).
6. Cf. Swedish Supreme Court NJA 1997 p. 418.
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that the differences concerning the prerequisites for liability under the provisions of the
Swedish Companies Act relating to the company's members of the board of directors, on
the one side, and the rules concerning liability of employees under Chapter 4 section 1 of
the Swedish Tort Liability Act,7 on the other hand, should be maintained. Extraordinary
reasons are necessary for an employee to be liable according to provisions of the latter Act.
The possibility of holding an employee liable should grow together with the employee's
rise in the company's hierarchy, since it is this circumstance that is considered important
according to the Act. Nevertheless, even here a distinction should be made between the
employees' and the board members' liability with respect to the different premises on which
liability is based. A deputy managing director who has not taken a permanent board member's place will not be liable in this capacity under the provisions of the Swedish Companies
Act, but will be liable under the provisions on employees of Chapter 4 section 1 of the
8
Swedish Tort Liability Act.
A person working on assignment, who is not employed by the company, shall be liable
under the general provisions of Chapter 18 of the Swedish Commercial Code concerning
the manager's liability for loss or damage caused by negligence. Thus, a person working
on assignment is not protected in the same way as an employee.
This analysis becomes more difficult when a member of the board of directors is
also employed by the company. It may sometimes be unclear in which capacity he has
caused damage. As mentioned before, the premises for liability differ depending on the
capacity in which the tortfeasor causes damage-whether as an employee or as a member
of the board.
This delineation is quite straightforward regarding decisions made by the board of directors, because the liability provisions of company law stipulated in Chapter 15 of the
Swedish Companies Act will always apply. Even when a member of the board has been
given a special assignment by the board to undertake certain measures regarding the company's operations, he shall be liable under the liability provisions of the Companies Act.
If a member of the board is more or less permanently active, performing assignments on
behalf of the board, a problem may arise in relation to the managing director's liability.
Under Chapter 8 section 25 of the Companies Act, it is the managing director who is
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company. If the company should decide
to institute other provisions that will affect this area of responsibility, the managing director
may risk becoming liable for loss caused by the holder of that position. Chapter 8 section
3 of the Swedish Companies Act stipulates that in such situations the board of directors
shall issue written instructions setting forth the allocation of duties of the managing director
and any other bodies that the board of directors may establish. Such division of duties will
diminish the managing director's liability by an equivalent degree.
Drawing a line between the liability provisions of the Swedish Companies Act and the
Swedish Tort Liability Act is more complicated if the duty of loyalty is at issue. The duty
of loyalty also covers a board member's behavior outside the meeting of the board of directors. The higher the position of an employee in the company's hierarchy, the more
complicated it is to draw a line between the two. If damages have been caused due to a

7. Tort Law Act of 2 June 1972, SFS 1972:207, as amended.
8. Tort Law Act of 2 June 1972, SFS 1972:207, as amended.
9. Swedish Commercial Code.
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breach of the duty of loyalty, liability should always be treated according to the provisions
of Chapter 15 of the Swedish Companies Act. For example, if a member of the board
disseminates confidential information about the company's affairs, or if he engages in competitive practices, this provision applies.

m. Determination of Culpability
A.

WHAT CRITERIA SHALL BE USED?

When determining liability, the Scandinavian legal system usually divides the culpability
requirements into subjective and objective elements.10 The objective requirements are that
a given act or omission shall be indefensible and contrary to law. The subjective requirements are that circumstances pertaining to the wrongdoer shall be taken into consideration.
The objective criteria used for the determination of a board member's or the managing
director's liability are constituted by the provisions of the Swedish Companies Act and the
articles of association, as well as by the obligations usually connected with the managerial
position of a person." Even Scandinavian law will tolerate, however, certain mistakes of the
board of directors or the managing director in business decision-making, provided that
these mistakes remain within the framework of the business operations' objectives and that
they have not been made in order to directly or indirectly further the decision-makers' own
interests. 2 This tolerance can be justified by the fact that a company must often make
business decisions in situations characterized by a lack of certainty. Coupled with the fact
that it is often necessary to take risks, this means that it is not a simple task for the courts
to determine, a posteriori, the suitability of the company management's decisions. This is
the strongest argument for the business judgment rule. It is only natural that this rule should
exhibit some discretionary features. It is hardly possible to determine the exact level of risk
or uncertainty that shall be tolerated." What is necessary, on the other hand, is for the
board to have based its decisions on sufficiently comprehensive documentation. Thus, in a
complicated merger it is not enough for the board of directors to be satisfied with a short
oral report, without any further written documentation concerning the question. 4 In conclusion, for a failed business endeavor not to create potential liability, it is necessary that
the authority of the company's bodies not have been overstepped, and that the members of
the board not have undertaken measures that have directly or indirectly promoted their
own interests.
In addition, an omission may form the basis of liability in cases where there is an obligation to act. In recent years a view has been promoted in Scandinavian law, which has
received support from American law, that omissions shall be deemed, at least in certain
cases, more strictly than active conduct.' An example of this kind of omission would be the
board of directors' failure to phase out the operations of a slumping business area in order
to reduce the losses of the company's creditors. Such an omission would not be covered by

10. Cf JAN HELLNER & SVANTEJOHANSSON, SKADESTANDSRATT

125 (6th ed., NorstedtsJuridik 2000).

11. See DOTEVALL, supra note 4, at 46.
12. See id. at 85; K. NORMAN AARUM,STYRELSEMEDLEMMERS ERSTATNINGSANSVAR IAKSJESELSKAPER 324(1994);

J. Scu.s
13. Cf
14. See
15. See

CHRISTENSEN, LEDELSE &AKTIOMNERER
52 (1992). Cf Swedish Supreme Court NJA 2000 s. 404.
SOFSRUD, supra note 3, at 143, for the opposite view.
id. at 151.
id. at 131.
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the business judgment rule with regard to liability. In such cases the board members' knowledge concerning the company's financial situation shall be examined in great detail. The
ordinary level of tolerance for wrong business decisions that is normally applied in Scandinavian law decreases if the financial situation of the company is weak. 6
B.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE TRTFEASOR

When determining culpability, it is impossible to wholly disregard the qualifications
of the member of the board or the managing director. In Chapter 8 section 9 of the
Companies Act only formal requirements have been explained regarding the board member's or the managing director's qualifications. These requirements include attainment
of the age of majority and no previous declaration of bankruptcy by board members or
managing directors.
In view of the fact that boards of directors are usually quite heterogeneous, it is probably
impossible to find some common, minimal standard that would apply to the board of directors' mandate." The fundamental requirement is that the member of the board shall
have sought the mandate of his own free will, being therefore personally responsible for
having sufficient experience and qualifications to succeed in his undertaking. If it can be
shown later on that he has not met the requirements placed on him, it is reasonable to
demand that he should resign."
A member of the board is not required to possess special knowledge of the sector in
which the company conducts its business. Such a requirement would promote one-sided
composition of boards of directors, which would not enhance the quality of the works of
such boards. On the other hand, it is necessary that a member of the board shall possess a
general ability to learn about the business of the company.
The question is whether the board member's liability may be treated as so-called professional liability. In determining professional liability, greater consideration is given to the
question of whether the objective criterion for what is considered as acceptable conduct has
been upheld, whereas circumstances concerning the tortfeasor and other issues of the individual case are of lesser importance. In my opinion, professional liability does not apply
in this sense to a member of the board. Instead, subjective circumstances should be considered when determining culpability in order not to prevent inexperienced persons from
seeking board mandates. Danish case law shows that in cases where the term of office of a
board member was short, and loss was sustained because a prospectus had been issued
containing wrong information about the company's financial situation, the member is exempt from liability.' 9 In the Danish Supreme Court, it has been confirmed that board
members who had recently assumed their duties were not liable for an agreement concluded
by the managing director. 0 The board members in question had assumed their duties five
months prior to the conclusion of the contract.2' The members could not be expected to

16. See Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 13, §§ 17-18; ROLF DoTEVALL, SKADESTANDSANSVAR FOR
STYRELSELEDAMOT OCH VERKSTALLANDE DIREKTOR 197 (Norstedts 1989).
17. See LARS E. TAXELL, ANSVAR OCH ANSVARSFORDELNING I AKTIEBOLAG 57 (Abo Akademi 1963).
18. See id. at 56.
19. See ROLF DOTEVALL, NAGA FRtGOR SOM ROR PROSPEKTANSVAR, NoRDISK TIDSSKRIFr FOR SELSKABSRET

331 (2000).
20. Danish Supreme Court UfR 1961.515.
21. Cf. SOFSRUD, supra note 3, at 394.
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become properly acquainted with the company until a certain time in office had passed.
This view of liability should be applied even to persons who hold several boards of director's
mandates. Since each company has a character of its own, it is difficult to talk about a
specific board of director profession.
The question of liability is treated in a different way regarding the managing director.
The managing director is supposed to be active on a full-time basis. Under the provision
of Chapter 8 section 2 5 of the Swedish Companies Act he is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the company. In view of this function, it is reasonable to place higher
demands on the managing director than on an individual board member.
Board members' responsibility varies depending on, inter alia, their working tasks and
the amount of remuneration received by them. It may be necessary, for example, to involve
an expert in a certain area of the board's work. Such a person will carry greater responsibility
than the other members of the board with regard to damage or loss sustained by the company within his field of expertise.2" This view may be disputed, however, on the grounds
that a board of directors is a collegial body. This means that an individual member of the
board shall not bear the primary responsibility for decisions made within a certain area. In
my opinion, the allocation of working tasks should reflect the distribution of responsibility
when an expert has been engaged by the board. If the shareholders appoint an expert in a
certain field, they expect that person to contribute with his special knowledge to the work
of the board. Likewise, if a certain member of the board receives higher remuneration than
the other members, this reflects that in the allocation of working tasks the member has a
greater responsibility than the remaining members for the supervision of the company's
operations.
A specialist who is also a member of the board bears greater responsibility than if he
acted as an external advisor only. In contrast, a lawyer who works on a special assignment
for a company has well-demarcated liability in that he has a duty to carry out his assignment
in the best possible way. For example, it may be that the external adviser has not been given
full information concerning all the circumstances of importance for the board's decision,
and his advice will hence be treated as only one of the components of the final decision. A
lawyer who is also a member of the board has much more extensive responsibility. Like the
other members of the board he enjoys access to all information, and it is his duty to obtain
any additional information that may be necessary for him to make well-grounded decisions.
In addition, he owes a duty of loyalty to the company, which means that he should show
regard to the company's interests at all times.
IV. Determination of Loss
It is hardly possible or even necessary to try to define a universally applicable concept of
loss. This means that the concept of loss must be formulated for each situation.23 At the
same time, a normative concept of loss appears somehow insufficient, which is why a few
general premises ought to be formulated.
Loss in the present context means a financially measurable financial loss that the plaintiff
has suffered unwillingly or against his will. For a company, such loss may consist of costs,

22. See TAXELL, supra note 17, at 56.
23. SeeHAKAN ANDERSSON, SKYDDSXNDAMAL
f6rlag 1993).

OCH ADEICVANS; OM SKADESTAkNDSANSVARETS GRANSER

298 (lustus

SPRING 2003

14

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

loss of income, or depreciation in the value of the company's property. This means that
loss includes factual depreciation in the value of the company's property as well as occurrences depriving the company of earnings or income. This can be the case, for example,
when a board member, disregarding his duty of loyalty towards the company, engages in
competitive practices.
In order to determine the amount of loss, the total assets of the injured party can be

compared with the hypothetical situation that would exist if the damage-causing act had
not occurred14 Thus, the loss constitutes the difference between the hypothetical and the
actual course of events. One difficulty of this method is that it may not be easy to reconstruct
the hypothetical course of events.
Where no loss has been sustained, the board members will not be liable even if they have
neglected their duties. For example, a board member may be thought to have acted negligendy by voting for an excessive salary for the managing director, especially when he has
hardly done any work for the company. Nevertheless, if the money has not been paid out,
the board member cannot be made liable, since the company has not sustained any loss.

V. The Requirement of Adequate Causal Connection
Regarding the company management's liability for damages, the general principle of the
law of damages stipulates that there shall be a causal connection between the sustained
damage and the culpable act or omission. Where several members of the board are liable
for damage the casual connection must be determined individually. Each member of the
board shall be liable only for that part of the damage that he has personally caused.
Traditionally, for liability to apply the causal connection must be adequate. This requirement screens out liability for consequences that are too remote and for unexpected consequences." The adequacy criterion makes it possible to separate out the legally relevant
causes from a complex chain of causes that led to damage. The object of an adequacy test
is the causal connection itself. Adequacy does not refer so much to the identification of a
6
causal connection, but rather to the evaluation of the causal connection. Determination

of adequacy thus aims at deciding whether the causal connection is sufficient to support a
liability determination.
In order to evade the most unexpected or remote consequences of an act or omission,

the doctrine of normative protection may be applied.27 By investigating the objective of a
given norm and the interests that it was originally meant to protect, the problem of determining the causes of recoverable loss may be solved. The normative protection doctrine is
based on the notion that the risk of the incurred damage has increased due to the fact that
6
the existing norms have been violated." There are several similarities between this mode
of procedure and the determination of liability in negligence. The function of the normative
protection doctrine is to identify which losses shall be compensated. It is natural to wish to
mitigate the requirement of foreseeability when a rule of the Companies Act or of the

24. SeeJAN

HELLNER, SPECIELL AVTALSRATT

II, 2ND BOOKLET. ALLMANNA AMNEN 207 (3d ed., Jurisff6rlaget

1996).
25. SeeHELLNER & JOHANSSON, supra note 10, at 195.
26. SeeANDERSSON, supra note 23, at 95.
27. See id. at 365. Cf 2 BILL W. DUFWA, FLERASKADEST..NDSSKYLDIGA 1017 Ouristf6rlaget 1993).
28. See ANDERSSON, supra note 23, at 39.
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company's articles of association has been violated, but at the same time liability should not
arise for loss or damage of an extraordinary character.2 9
Under the normative protection doctrine, liability arises even in connection with loss or
damage that can be described as remote or that is close but unexpected. This view of the
requirement of adequacy is based on the conditions applicable to a person exercising control
over some property that does not belong to him. In these cases, a strict view of liability is
applied to the person in control of the property if the property is damaged or its value
decreases. Based on the principle of casus mixtus, liability may be imposed even for loss or
damage that may be denoted as having an inadequate causal connection. ° This principle
probably plays some role in the determination of adequacy in relation to the managing
director's or a board member's liability to the company.
The rules concerning the company's financial accounting, which serve primarily to protect share purchasers, may play an important role in the determination of liability to the
company. Under the provision of Chapter 2 section 3 of the Swedish Annual Reports Act,
one of the fundamental requirements concerning annual reporting is that the annual report
shall provide a true picture of the company's financial position.3 It is especially important
that a company appear trustworthy if it is in a period of vigorous expansion or if it has
recently been listed on the stock exchange. If, due to incorrect bookkeeping, the company
reports a much better profit than should rightfully be reported, and this is discovered, the
company's credibility will suffer. If, over time, the company is declared insolvent, and the
drop in the company's earnings cannot be explained by a general decline in the economy,
this may indicate that there is an adequate causal connection between the incorrect accounting and the loss sustained by the company through its insolvency. In my view, if the
estate in liquidation commences an action for damages on behalf of the company against a
member of the board, the company's interests should be interpreted more widely, and
should cover even the company's creditors. In this way, the shareholders, as well as the
company's creditors, will receive compensation for the indirect damage they suffered following the company's insolvency."
VI. The Supervisory Duty
Under the provisions of Chapter 8 section 3 of the Swedish Companies Act the board
of directors shall be charged with the organization of business activities. The provisions of
Chapter 8 section 25 of the Act do not state explicitly that the managing director has an
equivalent obligation. However, this obligation ensues from the fact that the managing
director shall be responsible for the day-to-day management of the company, and it is
3
therefore his duty to monitor the company's everyday operations
The board of directors' obligation to organize the company's business activities has been
made more concrete by the requirement set forth in Chapter 8 section 3 of the Swedish

29. Cf

30. See

supra note 17, at 32.
HELLNER, supra note 24, at 207.

TAXELL,

31. Swedish Annual Reports Act, ch. 2, § 3.
32. See Rolf Dotevall, Liability of Members of the Board of Directorsand the ManagingDirector,41 SCANDINAVIAN
STUD. IN L. 41 (2001).
33. SeeReports of the Government Commissions ("SOU series") 1941:9, p. 324 and Swedish Government
Bill 1975:103, p. 374.
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Companies Act stipulating that the board of directors shall issue written instructions concerning the allocation of duties to the company's management and other organs that may
be instituted. The provisions of Chapter 8 section 4 stipulate that the board of directors
shall issue written instructions setting forth the rules for the reporting of information concerning the company's business activities, which shall form the basis of the board of direc4
tors' assessment of the company's financial position.
The Swedish Companies Act is based on the premise that the company's business activities shall be managed by the board of directors and the managing director, respectively. In
order to achieve effective organization of a company it is frequently necessary to delegate
various tasks. However, the possibility of delegation has certain limitations. One such limitation is the requirement that any delegation of tasks must be done in an efficient way, so
that the different office-holders are able to co-ordinate their functions and working tasks.
Since the management of the company has been charged with the organization of the
company, negligence in this respect may result in liability for damages.
The Swedish Companies Act does not impose any explicit limitations on the company
management's power of delegation of administrative tasks. This great freedom of organization provided for by the Act should not be interpreted, however, to suggest that the
possibility of delegation is unlimited. For example, delegation of powers whereby the
board of directors and the managing director renounce all responsibility is impossible.
Similarly, the board of directors or the managing director may not delegate authority
they do not possess.
Each administrative and management task specifically indicated in the Swedish Companies Act or the articles of association may be delegated in one way or another. The
limitations on delegation of administrative tasks follow from the supervisory duty of the
board members and the managing director. Thus the supervisory duty is the only duty that
cannot be delegated. The scope of the supervisory duty depends on the scope of delegation.
For example, as delegation of tasks increases, so does management's supervisory duty to
ensure that tasks are performed correctly. Even after delegation a hierarchical relationship
between the delegator and the person entrusted with the performance of the tasks is maintained. The duty of the delegator is reduced to the supervision of the performance of the
tasks, and ensuring that they will be discharged appropriately. This remaining authority
cannot be further delegated.
Even after the delegation of tasks, the principle remains that the members of the board
of directors and the managing director are formally liable for any damage caused by the
person entrusted with the performance of the tasks. However, for liability to arise it is
required that there be negligence on the part of the board or the managing director due
to (1) selection of the task performer, (2) inadequate instructions to the latter, or (3) flaws
in the supervision of the performance of the task. The fact that liability arises only on these
grounds manifests the fundamental principle of the law of damages that liability arises only
through one's own fault."
Supervision of the company's operations is not something static, but must be continuously adjusted to occurring changes. Chapter 8 section 4 of the Swedish Companies Act
clearly stipulates that the board of directors shall regularly assess the company's financial

34. Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 8.
35. SeeDOTEVALL, supra note 4, at 98.
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position, making the supervisory duty the fundamental obligation of each member of the
board.36 A member of the board has an obligation to regularly check the company's financial
position, irrespective of the degree of his actual involvement in the company's business.
This requirement is consistent with the current situation and practice, showing that the
board of directors in larger companies has a supervisory function."
Following the hierarchical structure, the basic principle stipulates that the supervisory
duty of the managing director includes the monitoring of the daily business activities of the
company, in which fulfillment of the obligations by the company's employee is of primary
importance. In comparison, the primary task of the board of directors is to monitor the
company's operations in general, ensuring that the managing director fulfills his duties.
This delineation of responsibilities follows from the structure of the Swedish Companies
Act. This means that the managing director is primarily liable for damage caused by his
employees. Only in exceptional cases, perhaps primarily in smaller companies, may the
members of the board become liable.
Regarding the scope of the supervisory duty, a member of the board does not normally
have to investigate every aspect of the managing director's administration. It is not the duty
of a board member to go so far in his supervisory activity as to review each decision made
by the managing director. If there are reasons to suspect that the managing director mismanages his work, the member of the board should get more information, perhaps from
the company's auditor. Otherwise, the board of directors shall devote itself to the central
problems of the company's business operations, with emphasis placed on the company's or
its subsidiaries' financial position, whereas the managing director shall attend to the daily
operations of the company. It is therefore not required that a member of the board have
the knowledge of or be involved in each detail of the company's business.38 A formally
appointed managing director cannot avoid liability if he has completely neglected his supervisory duty in the belief that someone else is in charge of certain tasks associated with
the position (for example, the company's accounting).
The scope of supervisory duty is not elucidated by the Swedish Companies Act. Thus
the exact scope of the duty depends on the organization and business activities of each
particular company. It is ultimately a pragmatic judgment. Nevertheless, even though the
scope of supervision must be decided primarily on the basis of the circumstances in each
particular case, certain general principles may be noted.
The provisions of Chapter 8 section 4 of the Swedish Companies Act indicate that supervision shall be carried out through a reporting system.3 9 In the exercise of the supervisory
duty, the degree of confidence placed in the information supplied by the subordinate employer is of great importance. One starts from the premise that members of the board shall
be able to rely on the information provided by employees concerning the conditions prevalent in the company until something arises that gives them reason to suspect that something is wrong.4 Furthermore, a member of the board is not obliged to further monitor
the company's business activities if the report from the managing director is in good order.
However, in certain cases more extensive supervision is required. 41 For example, the
supervisory duty becomes more stringent if the company's operating capital is insufficient
36.
37.
38.
39.

Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 8.
Cf. SOFSRUD, supra note 3, at 162, with further references.
See Norwegen Supreme Court NRt 1979 p. 46.
Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 8.
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with regard to the scope and risk of the operations conducted by the company. This situation
includes the company that is dependent on a small number of customers or business transactions in progress, the company whose turnover decreases, the company who's most important customers experience financial difficulties, or the company whose management
42
comes to be dominated by one person.
VII. What Interests should be considered by a Board
Member and the Managing Director?
The term "company's interests" usually means the interests of all the shareholders of the
company. 43 Are there any special interests that have to be considered with regard to subsidiaries? Under the Swedish Companies Act there are various special legal effects that are
associated with subsidiary companies. This applies to consolidated annual reports as well
as to certain rules regarding information exchange between the parent company and its
subsidiaries. Nevertheless, subsidiaries do not constitute separate legal entities. This means
that a member of the board or the managing director should only take into account the
interests embraced by his mandate.
When a subsidiary of a group company enters into a contract, the subsidiaries of the
group company may be perceived by a third party as one entity. The board mandate that
arises with regard to the parent company is based on the legal rules of authorization. The
fact that a subsidiary shall not be regarded as an entity from the point of view of company
law means that the board of directors of that subsidiary cannot give consideration to the
interests of other subsidiaries at the expense of the subsidiary's own interests.- In this
regard, the general clause of Chapter 8 section 34 of the Swedish Companies Act means
that transactions between subsidiaries shall be conducted preferably on strictly business
45
lines, unless it is the question of the distribution of profits.
If the parent company is in actual charge of the management of the subsidiary, it can be
liable under the provisions concerning liability of shareholders provided in Chapter 15
section 3 of the Swedish Companies Act. 46 The parent company may avoid such liability if
formal decisions are made at the annual general meeting. 47 If the members of the board of
directors or the managing director enforce a given decision despite the fact that it contravenes a provision of the Swedish Companies Act, the company's management will become
liable. Under Chapter 8 section 34 of the Swedish Companies Act the company's management must always ascertain that directives received from superior bodies of the company
4
are consistent with the articles of association of the company and the Companies Act.
Vicarious business liability cannot be applied to hold a parent company liable for acts
committed by a subsidiary's board of directors. 49 Chapter 3 section 1 of the Swedish Tort
Act is not applicable here because a member of the board or the managing director of a

42. See
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supra note 4, at 102. Cf Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 13, §§ 17-18.
supra note 4, at 112; NORMANN AARUM,supra note 12, at 363; ERIK WERLAUFF, SELSKABSMASKEN: LOYALITETSPLIGT OG GENERALKLAUSUL I SELSKABSRETTEN 72 (Gad 1991).
44. See S. FRIS HANSEN, EUKOPEISK KONCERNRET 315 (1996); SOFSRUD, supra note 3, at 263.
45. Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 8.
46. Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 15.
47. See PAUL K. ANDERSEN, STUDIER I DANSKKONCERNRET 631 Gurist-og Okonomforbundets Forlag 1997).
48. Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 8.
49. See SOFSRUD, supra note 3, at 277.

VOL. 37, NO. 1

A SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVE

19

subsidiary company is formally involved in the aforesaid capacity in a different legal entity.
They have been appointed as such by the annual general meeting of the subsidiary. The
fact that they are also employees of the parent company cannot lead to vicarious liability.
However, it must finally be noted that Scandinavian legal practice shows that the parent
company may sometimes become liable for the undertakings of its subsidiary company
despite the lack of legislative support. This may take place if the subsidiary company engages
in similar business activities as those pursued by the parent company as well as having the
same board of directors.
VIII. The Meaning of the Duty of Loyalty
A.

THE DurY OF LOYALTY UNDER THE SWEDISH COMPANIES ACT AND ARTICLES
OF ASSOCIATION

Not all of the duties of the managing director and the board of directors can be determined on the basis of the Swedish Companies Act. The mandate of a member of the board
of directors as well as obligations usually connected with the managerial position of a board
member and the managing director, are accompanied by a duty of loyalty towards the
principal (such as all the shareholders). The duty of loyalty is described in more specific
terms in the general clause and the provisions on the conflict of interests in Chapter 8 of
the Swedish Companies Act.
The general clause set forth in Chapter 8 section 34 of the Swedish Companies Act states
that the board of directors and the managing director may not undertake measures that
might provide an undue advantage to a shareholder or other person to the disadvantage of
the company or another shareholder. 5° All shareholders shall be treated alike. If the special
treatment has no support in the Companies Act or the articles of association, then nobody
shall profit at the cost of the company or any individual shareholder.
A conflict of interests may be of a more subtle character than, for example, where property
has been wrongly evaluated. Even an agreement concluded on strictly business lines may
be disadvantageous to the company. It may be the question of property that is very difficult
to sell, so that the company has a small chance to sell it, if it should wish to do that, without
loss. An acquisition of property is compatible with the object of business operations only if
the company can sell the property within a reasonable period of time without loss.
With regards to business objectives established by the articles of association, the Supreme
Court established in 2000 that members of the board neglect their duties by undertaking
1
measures not encompassed by the business objectives of the company."
Prior to 2000, case
law held only a serious deviation from the business objectives constituted neglect of duties. 2
In my opinion, it is not very suitable to scrap the requirement of a serious deviation from
the business objectives. Business objectives are frequently formulated in such a way that it
can be difficult to draw a clear line. Imposing on the board of directors the obligation to
gain support for a planned measure is hardly suitable, taking into consideration the delays
that may be caused and the risk that sensitive information about the company's business
operations may be exposed. The 2000 decision of the Supreme Court may be suitable for

50. Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 8.
51. Supreme Court MA 2000 p. 404.
52. SeeSwedish Supreme Court NJA 1987 p. 394.
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companies with a small number of shareholders, but is not suitable for public companies
with extended shareholdings. For these companies, the requirement of a serious deviation
should be applicable.
The provisions of Chapter 8 sections 20 and 28 of the Companies Act state that a member
of the board or the managing director may not participate in decisions regarding agreements
between himself and the company.5 3 In such cases there will be a conflict of interests irrespective of the content of the contract. Regarding an agreement between the company and
third parties, the member of the board or the managing director shall not have a material
interest in the matter that may conflict with the interests of the company.
What are the criteria that should be used to determine how serious a given deviation
from the business objective is? The normal view in Scandinavian law is that such a deviation
occurs when it is a question of a large shareholders' percentage in the legal entity being
constituted by the opposing party.5 4 Conflicting interests of serious character also arise with
respect to contracts between the company and the spouse or relatives of the member of the
board or the managing director.55
appearing in the provisions conThe expression "take part in matters regarding.
cerning conflicts of interest means that a member of the board or the managing director
may not participate in any stage of the decision process.56 In Danish law, the conflict of
interest rule does not preclude a member of the board to whom the rule applies from
providing information of a factual character to the remaining members of the boardY
The provisions on conflicts of interest may not prevent a member of the board from
exercising pressure on the remaining members of the board without the member being
regarded as having acted against the interest of the company under the provisions of the
Swedish Companies Act. This is applicable particularly in situations in which a member of
the board is a party to an agreement. One way of reducing this risk is to discard the formal
rule on conflicts of interest in agreements between the company and board members or
the managing director in favor of a substantive rule that the factual character of the decision
shall be examined. Thus, in order to show that a given member of the board or the managing
director was partial, the company would have to show that the agreement was disadvantageous to the company.
B.

COMPETITIVE PRACTICES

When speaking of competitive practices, a member of the board or the managing director
must have an interest that is in conflict with the company's interests. Practices are to be
regarded as competitive if they are encompassed by the business objectives stipulated in the
articles of association. The involvement of a member of the board or the managing director
in the competitive practices must be strong enough to be regarded as a breach of the duty
of loyalty.
It is of no importance whether the company is financially capable of conducting the
business activities in question or not. The objective of the duty of loyalty is to prevail upon

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2, ch. 8.
See DOTEVALL, supra note 4, at 129.
See Swedish Supreme Court NJA 1982 p. 1.
Swedish Companies Act, supra note 2.
See SOFSRUD, supra note 3, at 364, with further references.

VOL. 37, NO. 1

A SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVE

21

the members of the board and the company's management to devote all their strength to
the business operations of the company. The provisions on the conflicts of interest of the
Swedish Companies Act show that competitive practices must be quite extensive to be
regarded as representing a breach of the duty of loyalty.5
The question arises whether members of the board involved on a full-time basis in the
work of the company should be treated differently from members who only hold the board
of directors' mandate, but who are not actively involved in the work of the company. The
Swedish Companies Act does not differentiate between the obligations of board members
who are employed by the company and those who only hold mandates in the board of
directors.5 9 This means that even board members who are not employed by the company
may not engage in competitive practices. A more extensive financial involvement in the
competitive practices of a board member not employed by the company would be necessary,
however, if such conduct were to constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty.
One problem that is connected with the question of the degree to which a board member
may be involved in competitive practices may be the member's opportunities to enter into
business transactions that he knows about for personal gain. The theory of corporate opportunities, developed in American law, has strongly influenced European law.6° This theory
entails that it is a board member's duty to let the company profit by the business opportunities falling within the company's sphere of business activities.
The question is whether any distinction should be made between companies based on
their size. In such a case, a more general outlook should be applied to public companies.
In these companies, board members who were not employed by the company would have
certain opportunities to use for themselves business opportunities falling within the company's sphere of activities. In contrast, this sort of thing would be totally prohibited in the
case of board members employed by the company. In smaller companies, each case would
have to be tried separately in order to establish whether the company has economic possibilities to make use of a given business opportunity. If a business opportunity is directed
at a subsidiary of a group of companies whose business activities are different from those
of the parent company, the duty of loyalty of a board member towards the parent company's
management does not cover the business activity of the subsidiary.
IX. Right to Institute Proceedings
Under Chapter 15 section 7 of the Swedish Companies Act proceedings with respect to
damage incurred by the company may be brought not only by the majority of the shareholders, but also by a minority consisting of the owners of not less that one-tenth of all the
shares of the company.6 Chapter 15 section 14 of the Act says that even an estate in liquidation may institute proceedings for damages.62 The issue that has recently been discussed
concerns the question of whether the limitation of 10 percent of share ownership may be
set aside, so that shareholders with a lower percentage of shares may also be permitted to
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bring a claim for compensation for damages. In American63law, the derivative suit is a possible
alternative for shareholders who only possess one share.
Despite the disadvantage of increased litigation that may be connected with the shareholder's right to institute derivative proceedings against members of the board, it plays an
important role as a safety measure for the shareholders' minority. This is evidenced by the
changes in German law where derivative proceedings of shareholders in private companies
(GmbH) have been regarded as acceptable. The same course of development may be observed in English law. 64 Therefore, there is substantial support for the view that such proceedings should be allowed with regard to companies with a small number of shareholders,
but not to public companies.
X. Concluding Remarks
Regarding liability of the board members and the managing director to the company a
clear pattern has been discerned in recent years indicating that there is a limit to the degree
of failure that can be tolerated with regard to the company's business activities. This means
that a member of the board may not be disloyal to the company by promoting his own
interests, either directly or indirectly. The term "company" in Swedish law does not only
refer to the existing shareholders, but even to future shareholders of the company. Further,
the company's management ought to show caution when the company's financial position
is weak. In these cases the supervisory duty becomes stricter.
With regards to the company management's obligations, the recent amendments to the
Swedish Companies Act and the division into public and private companies indicate that
the supervisory duty of the board member has become especially important. The supervisory duty entails not only that attention should be paid to the financial circumstances of
the company, but also to the question of whether the company's business activities fall within
its business objectives, and whether they are in line with the object of the company's operations. Adjudications of the courts show more stringency in that a measure is regarded as
contrary to the obligations if it is in variance with the business objectives stipulated by the
articles of association. The earlier requirement of a serious neglect of obligations has not
been maintained, which is rather unfortunate. A more subtle distinction should be made
between companies with few shareholders, where a stricter line should be drawn, whereas
greater tolerance against violations of business objectives in public companies can be shown.
With regard to the duty of loyalty of a board member and the managing director, it has
been established that their involvement is considerable. This implies that a higher degree
of proprietary interests shall be required. It is possible that greater involvement is required
from a board member employed by the company, as compared to a member who is not
employed by the company. Further, attention should be paid to whether the company is a
public or a private company. In public companies a more general outlook can be applied
regarding the assessment of whether a business opportunity shall accrue to the company or
whether it may be freely used by the board member. A board member who is not employed
by the company would be able to use such an opportunity.
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